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ABSTRACT: The relatively swift negotiation and implementation of the UNESCO Convention on the
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (CCD) invites us to consider what
came before it and what may follow. This article reviews experience with the creation of cultur al “shelf
space” under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) through the use of a cultural
“exception” and how this experience served as an important impetus for Canadian leadership in the
negotiation and conclusion of the CCD. The article goes on to consider the CCD’s potential impact as
custom and process in the creation of cultural “shelf space” internationally.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This article is about the creation of “shelf space”. The term “shelf space” is used in colloquial
English to denote the making of room for desirable things that one might want close at hand.
The concept is an inviting one because it implies ready access to something that is otherwise
hard to obtain.
In this instance, the term “shelf space” is used metaphorically to refer to a key debate arising in
the intersection between international trade regulation and cultural protection. That debate is
about making room for a variety of cultural products. The reason for doing so is relatively clear.
Some cultural products would not survive if disciplines on free trade were to prevail in every
instance. There would be a loss of cultural diversity. Creating “shelf space” is therefore about
efforts to protect and promote cultural pluralism, and more generally, about the loss humanity
would suffer in cultural effacement if these efforts did not take place.
The term “shelf space” is one that gained popularity in Canada in the late 1980s after Canada
sought a measure of protection for Canadian culture in its free trade agreement with the United
States of 1988.2 This “cultural exception” was later carried over into the North American Free
Trade Agreement of 1994.3
This article argues that the express exception for Canadian culture eventually embodied in
NAFTA Art. 2106 was never formally invoked and instead served as a kind of “marker”, or
symbol, for cultural protection – with important consequences. One was that the wording of the
exception tended to focus debate about culture on a single legal provision, as if it possessed a
talismanic quality. Once the exception was circumvented, however, it was exposed as having
little real legal value. The second consequence was that the attention paid to the exception
tended to highlight its strict terms. As a result, other sources of obligation in the field of
cultural protection were neglected. The third consequence was that the exception itself was
never formally invoked and was therefore something that could be regarded either negatively or
positively. The outcome was ambiguity but also space within which to express a distinct voice.
The article also argues that the experience with a formal, defined exception for culture - far
from being a failure – served as an impetus for Canadian leadership in the negotiation and
conclusion of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of
Cultural Expressions (CCD)4 and may well shape the way in which the CCD is interpreted as a
1
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conventional and customary source of international law in the future. The CCD is similarly
ambiguous, but it must be considered alongside the development of customary international law
in the area and contains a number of process mechanisms that may permit the ambiguity to be
shaped creatively over time. In that sense, the CCD can be seen as an attempt to secure cultural
“shelf space” internationally.
This article is therefore about many things. It is, first and foremost, about the idea of shelf
space and Canada’s efforts to protect its culture(s) internationally. Yet it is also about rights and
obligations in relation to culture, and about the vital need for balance. That balance is unlikely
to be achieved once and for all, particularly vis-à-vis culture, and so the CCD offers ways for
the balance to be struck on an ad hoc basis by pointing to custom and process, thereby allowing
for the emergence of shelf space. The outcome should be a more satisfying reconciliation of
culture and trade disciplines.
2. CANADA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND CULTURAL PROTECTION
As many people who write in the field of cultural protection have observed, culture is difficult
to discuss because of the problem of definition. Just what is “culture”, and how far do its
boundaries extend?5 There have been attempts to provide a definition in international
instruments, but even here the plurality of definitions should alert us to the fact that culture is
an exceedingly vague and nebulous concept, and therefore legally speaking, something to be
contested. A kind of frustration easily sets in. Culture is maddening in its formlessness, and yet
like the Cheshire Cat in Alice in Wonderland, somehow it always manages to leave its smile
behind.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of December 1948 speaks of each person having
“the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development
of his personality”6 and the right “freely to participate in the cultural life of the community”.7
Other rights expressed in the Declaration can be regarded as underpinning these entitlements. 8
These were later repeated, and to some extent amplified, in the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of December 1966.9 Nevertheless, the Universal
Declaration and the ICESCR are broad-brush statements about many things. They do not say
much about what the content of culture is, or about cultural diversity.
Instead, we have to look to UNESCO-sponsored documents such as the non-binding
Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation of 196610 which states that:
1) “each culture has a dignity and value which must be respected and
preserved”
2) “every people has the right and the duty to develop its culture”
3) “in their rich variety and diversity, and in the reciprocal influences they exert
on one another, all cultures form part of the common heritage of mankind”
John A. Ragosta, The Cultural Industries Exemption from NAFTA – It’s Parameters, 23 CAN. – U.S. L.J. 165 (1997) (discussing the
problem of definition in relation to culture and cultural industries).
6
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III) (Dec. 10, 1948), Art. 22.
7
Ibid., Art. 27.
8
See, for instance, the right expressed in Art. 27(2) of the Universal Declaration to the protection of moral and material interests in
intellectual property and the duty expressed in Art. 29(1) that “[e]veryone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full
development of his personality is possible.”
9
6 I.L.M. 368 (1967). See for instance Art. 15(1) concerning the right “to take part in cultural life” and “to benefit from the protection
of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.”
10
Nov. 4, 1966, UNESCO Standard-Setting Instruments, IV.C. (1994).
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There are several notable aspects about culture in these statements. First, cultures are regarded
as monolithic in their entitlement to dignity, respect and preservation. This runs contrary to the
malleable nature of culture but was probably inevitable given the constraints of legal drafting.
Second, cultures are inherent in a “people”, something which undercuts the state-centered
nature of the international system. In UNESCO’s formulation, a people might have a culture
distinct from that of the dominant national culture they are found within. Third, people have
both rights and obligations in relation to cultural development, implicitly underlining the need
for legal balance in cultural protection. No right is enjoyed absolutely. Fourth, culture is biotic,
or in other words, something that is evolutionary and constantly changing.
Each of these characteristics identified in the UNESCO Declaration hints at how difficult it is
to protect and promote culture, and is undoubtedly the reason why subsequent international
instruments in the field of cultural protection have aimed at the concrete. These include the
Convention concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage of 1972,11 the
Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage of 2001,12 the Convention for
the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of 200313 and the Declaration concerning
the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage of 2003.14 The instruments approach the
question of cultural protection from different angles, yet they offer little in the way of
protecting culture comprehensively, or in other words, as a living good.
More recently, some efforts have been made to get more directly at the complex issue of culture
and cultural diversity, and this resulted in the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity of
2001 and the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural
Expressions (CCD) of 2005. The Declaration held cultural diversity to be “the common
heritage of humanity”, “as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature” and
“indissociable from respect for the dignity of the individual”. 15 The Declaration was
championed by France and Canada and it is Canadian experience with cultural protection that
will be focused on here to explain the subsequent shape of the CCD.
Canada has always had difficulty distinguishing itself culturally from its more powerful
neighbors. Despite the fact that it enjoys a high standard of living and sits at or near the top of
the U.N.’s Human Development Index, its ability to define, and therefore to project, what is
distinctively Canadian has been weak and subject to constant challenge. Canadian federal
government intervention in the cultural sector began as early as 1849 with the establishment of
a postal subsidy for newspapers, magazines and books, but in the years prior to the 1920s was
limited to heritage institutions such as museums and archives, and to the regulation of wireless
communication. In the 1920s and 1930s federal government involvement expanded to include
broadcasting and the protection of copyright, arts and film. 16 Later in the 1940s and 1950s the
federal government sponsored the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts,
Letters and Sciences, the Royal Commission on Broadcasting, the establishment of the Canada
Council to fund the humanities, arts and social sciences, and founding of the National Library.
The 1960s witnessed the consolidation of the national museums and the establishment of new
11
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federal cultural institutions, such as the National Arts Centre, as well as the creation of a de
facto department of culture in the form of the Department of the Secretary of State. In the
1970s, the federal government began to expand its definition of “culture” to include
bilingualism, biculturalism and multiculturalism. Canada is a historically bilingual country of
English- and French-speaking peoples, but it also possesses a heritage of First Nations Peoples
and more recently has been the destination for immigrants around the world. These changes
required government in the 1960s and 1970s to confront, and try to define more directly, what
Canadian culture was. Thus, the government intensified its focus on supporting Canadian
cultural content and on the status of the artist, as well as taking the first steps to understand the
impact of digital technologies on culture and society.
By the 1980s federal responsibility for cultural policy had been transferred, at least partially, to
the federal Minister of Communications and efforts began to expand broadcasting and
communications to Aboriginal communities in Northern Canada. During this period, a number
of major cultural policy reviews were conducted. Canada also continued its membership in
UNESCO, an organization it had been active in since 1945.
The 1990s were years of major change in federal cultural policy. Most of the legislation and
responsibilities for cultural policy were transferred to the new Department of Canadian
Heritage in 1993, and during this period the cultural sector experienced deep budget cuts as a
result of a federal government-wide Program Review. At the same time, international pressures
prompted major reviews of culture and trade and the establishment of culture as the “third
pillar” of foreign policy. New technologies were also beginning to have a significant impact on
the cultural sector, leading to changes in the Copyright Act, the Broadcasting Act, and licensing
by the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) of various
new broadcasting services.
In the first decade of the new century, federal cultural policies continue to grapple with the
many challenges of technological change, while dealing with new demands on both the
domestic and international scene. Sharing of cultural content on the internet led to further reexamination of the Copyright Act, to the formation of federally sponsored rights collectives,
and to Canadian governments’ moving aggressively to deliver services and content online. 17 On
the international front, Canada became a leader in the development of the UNESCO CCD.
Despite these developments, the reality is that the average Canadian knows very little of the
intricate legal apparatus that shapes the culture of the world in which they live. Life is different in
Canada than it is in many countries, and it is identifiably so for many reasons, whether in the
form of mandated Canadian content on the radio or television, the hefty annual subsidies
bestowed to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the National Film Board, the “Can Lit”
that makes its ways into Canadian bookstores, and so forth. This web of cultural regulation is
virtually invisible inside Canada.
The product of this cultural machinery also works in an opaque - and even hypocritical - way.
Canada’s major cities are convenient stand-ins for major American and European cities and
dozens of Hollywood film crews work on location in Canada each year. Canadian cultural icons
like Margaret Atwood, Diana Krall, Avril Lavigne, Céline Dion, Atom Egoyan, Keanu Reeves,
The Tragically Hip, Our Lady Peace, Sarah McLachlin and Gordon Pinsett continue to make
17
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their way on the world stage, but in the United States and elsewhere they generally do so without
being identifiably Canadian. The television program Anne of Avonlea is a hit in Iran, the Cirque
du Soleil continues to draw large crowds in Las Vegas, and Statistics Canada reports that
Canadian cultural exports are higher than ever before, yet one would never know this speaking to
most Canadians. A sense of cultural poverty subsists. Located as we are next to the largest and
most dynamic cultural market in the world, it is easy for Canadians to see ourselves as under
threat, hence the critical need to create “shelf space”.
The term “shelf space” is something that has entered into the Canadian cultural vocabulary in the
last few decades to signify the making of conscious efforts to provide Canadian cultural content
in a crowded and competitive world. It is not officially defined. Rather, shelf space is a term that
has been used by both official and non-governmental sources to refer to the foregoing set of
ideas. A recent statement from the Department of Canadian Heritage about the current state of
film and video broadcasting in Canada observed:
With strong backing from the Broadcasting Act and under licensing rules set out
by the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission
(CRTC), "shelf space" is guaranteed for Canadian content, including Canadian
feature films. But in making the jump from the small screen to the big screen,
Canadian filmmakers find themselves in a cinema market which has unfolded in
a decidedly non-Canadian setting: only 2 percent of box office revenues in
Canada are earned from Canadian movies.18
Of course, looked at from the perspective that this statement implies – one which recognizes the
defensive and offensive aspects of Canadian cultural policy – one can understand something of
the frustration felt by the United States about what has happened in recent years. Cultural
protection is unfair, unless one buys the claim that protective measures are actually necessary to
counter the still greater unfairness of a U.S. cultural industry whose returns to scale allow it to
dominate global markets.
These were precisely the claims that Canada’s federal government had to answer to in negotiating
a free trade agreement with the United States in the late 1980s. As is generally known, the
“cultural exception” or “exemption” came into being in the Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement of 1988. In his memoirs Canada’s Ambassador to the United States at that time, Allan
Gotlieb, relates that the exception came about at the last minute as a sop to cultural interests and
was the subject of furious negotiation, hence the tempered and contradictory nature of the final
result.19 Article 2005 of the agreement reads as follows:

18

See Department of Canadian Heritage, Our Story in Pictures: Film and Video Broadcasting, available at www.pch.gc.ca/pcch/mindep/misc/culture/htm/3.htm.
19
Gotlieb’s diary contains the following entry: “October 4, 1987: Around 9 p.m., just as we were nearing the end [of the free trade
negotiations], we got into a furious argument with [James] Baker and [Clayton] Yeutter about the cultural exemption. They wanted
some language that was totally inconsistent with the exemption, but after sharp words, bitter debate and acrimony, we settled on a
formula that basically recognizes the U.S. right to retaliate for cultural measures in certain circumstances. A tempest in a teapot that
will, alas, lead to a genuine tempest back home when people read the words and ask, “Was culture on the table?” It wasn’t. All we did
was recognize that the United States reserves its rights. But that fine point will be difficult to get across.” ALLAN GOTLIEB, THE
WASHINGTON DIARIES 1981-1989 494-495 (2006).
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Article 2005: Cultural Industries
1. Cultural industries are exempt from the provisions of this Agreement, except
as specifically provided in Article 401 (Tariff Elimination), paragraph 4 of
Article 1607 (divestiture of an indirect acquisition) and Articles 2006 and 2007
of this Chapter.
2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, a Party may take
measures of equivalent commercial effect in response to actions that would have
been inconsistent with this Agreement but for paragraph 1.20
As Gotlieb predicted at the time, public reaction to this provision in Canada was mixed – and
rightly so. Black’s Law Dictionary defines an “exception” as “something that is excluded from a
rule’s operation”, but as Gotlieb himself points out, the United States had reserved its rights in
Art. 2005(2) and the reservation went to the very heart of the matter. There can be no true
exception where a right to retaliate continues to exist. Consequently, the perception lingered that
“culture was not in the agreement, but neither was it left out.”21
Despite such qualms the exception was carried over, with little amendment, into the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) five years later as NAFTA Art. 2106.22 It did not
apply directly to Mexico. For its part, the United States continued to maintain that if Canada
wanted to protect culture “it had to pay for it”.23
A formal exception for cultural protection in NAFTA tended to emphasize certain things. One of
these was the very fact of a formal exception, something which could be raised in law to derogate
from liberalization obligations. There was a kind of talismanic quality to it, as though the
exception was all that was keeping Canadians safe from the hordes south of the border. That was
plainly not the case.
The second thing that Art. 2106 tended to do was to focus all attention on the terms of the
exception itself as opposed to seeing the exception as a manifestation of an internationally
recognized norm of cultural diversity. By the mid-1990s a number of international instruments
articulated rights concerning culture, yet few efforts were made to link it to those norms. The
exception was construed as “all”.
The term “cultural industries” was given the following definition: “cultural industry means an enterprise engaged in any of the
following activities: a) the publication, distribution, or sale of books, magazines, periodicals, or newspapers in print or machine
readable form but not including the sole activity of printing or typesetting any of the foregoing, b) the production, distribution, sale or
exhibition of film or video recordings, c) the production, distribution, sale or exhibition of audio or video music recordings, d) the
publication, distribution, or sale of music in print or machine readable form, or e) radio communication in which the transmissions are
intended for direct reception by the general public, and all radio, television and cable television broadcasting undertakings and all
satellite programming and broadcast network services.”
21
The quote paraphrases Graham Carr, who observed in 1991 that “culture may be exempted from the agreement, but ‘it most
assuredly has not been left out’”. Graham Carr, Trade Liberalization and the Political Economy of Culture: An International
Perspective, 6 CANADIAN-AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY 7-8 (June 1991). John Rogosta also describes the ambiguity of the situation as
follows: “The system to date actually has worked quite well to avoid disputes on this issue and on culture in general, because there has
been a quiet status quo or a sort of ‘No Man’s Land’”. Both governments have disagreed about exactly how the cultural terms should
be interpreted, but both governments have been loathe to really force the issue.” John A. Ragosta, The Cultural Industries Exemption
from NAFTA – It’s Parameters, 23 CAN. – U.S. L.J. 165, 169 (1997).
22
The text of NAFTA Annex 2106 reads as follows: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, as between Canada and
the United States, any measure adopted or maintained with respect to cultural industries, except as specifically provided in Article 302
(Market Access - Tariff Elimination), and any measure of equivalent commercial effect taken in response, shall be governed under this
Agreement exclusively in accordance with the provisions of the Canada - United States Free Trade Agreement. The rights and
obligations between Canada and any other Party with respect to such measures shall be identical to those applying between Canada
and the United States.” The definition of “cultural industries” is the same as in the previous footnote.
23
See John A. Ragosta, The Cultural Industries Exemption from NAFTA – It’s Parameters, 23 CAN. – U.S. L.J. 165, 167 (1997).
20
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The third thing that a formal exception did was to emphasize the uniqueness of the exception,
when in fact there were at the time several other international economic instruments with cultural
protection clauses in them, most notably the EC treaties, and that these could be jointly regarded
as embodying custom.24 It was as if Canada had a first on its hands – a confirmation of its
uniqueness and something to assert its distinctiveness about – when that was far from true.
The Periodicals dispute between Canada and the United States in the World Trade Organization
in 1996 laid to rest any illusions that Canadians may have had about the validity of the
exception.25 The dispute itself involved restrictions on split-run advertising that effectively
prohibited American publications from launching Canadian editions with a mix of Canadian and
recycled U.S. editorial content. The WTO Appellate Body agreed that Canadian and U.S.
periodicals were “directly competitive or substitutable products” notwithstanding the difference
in content and therefore subject to the non-discrimination obligation in GATT Art. III:2, second
sentence. From an economic perspective, the panel had observed that “cultural identity was not at
issue” and the Appellate Body did nothing to contradict this view.26 NAFTA Art. 2106 was not
invoked in the dispute, probably because of uncertainty about whether a NAFTA provision could
be successfully applied under the WTO Agreement, but the case was nevertheless regarded as a
kind of cultural Waterloo for Canada, a loss.
In the wake of Periodicals the idea of a formal cultural exception to NAFTA or WTO obligations
lost much of its attraction. In 1998 an advisory panel on cultural policy to Canada’s Minister of
International Trade concluded that the exception was not working and that therefore the country
should move in the direction of developing a multilateral instrument with other like-minded
countries. This led to Canada’s championing of efforts in this direction at UNESCO beginning
with the Declaration on Cultural Diversity in December 200127 and promoting the eventual
conclusion of the CCD in October 2005.
The swift conclusion of the CCD was assisted by the absence of the United States from UNESCO
for at least part of its drafting, but it also has to be regarded as part of a larger diplomatic effort by
Canada in the post-Cold War period.28 In this context Canada championed the conclusion of the
24

See Delia Ferri, EU Participation in the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural
Expressions: Some Constitutional Remarks, European Diversity and Autonomy Papers 3/2005. Ferri observes that the original
European treaties “did not recognize any legal area for actions in favour of culture, but the interaction between culture and European
Union law is of course more long-standing.” See Ferri, supra, at 11. See also RACHEL CRAUFURD SMITH, CULTURE AND EUROPEAN
UNION LAW (2004).
25
Bruce Jamieson, Trade Liberalization: Culture, Identity and Social Cohesion 125-129 (2000) available at
www.international.gc.ca/eet/pdf/06-en.pdf referring to the Cultural Industries Sectoral Advisory Group on International Trade
(SAGIT) position paper Strategies for Culture and Trade: Canadian Culture in a Global World (Feb. 1999).
26
Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/R, para. 5.45 (March 14, 1997).
27
45 I.L.M. 269 (2006).
28
Jennifer Welsh summarized the rationale behind Canada’s position as follows:
“There is also a more hard-headed case against conceiving of foreign policy solely as trade policy. While
Hart’s argument may have had some resonance during the 1990s, when the west had won the Cold War and
was enjoying an unprecedented level of security, the post-9/11 era presents a host of new threats to
international peace and security for all states that make up the so-called west. Canadian foreign policy must
actively address these threats, in collaboration with other actors on the international stage. In short, Canada
must do more than buy and sell. It must contribute to the creation of new rules and structures to manage
global problems. It must build capacity in other members of the international community so that they too can
contribute, economically and politically. And if the Canadian view on how to address new threats and
problems differs from that of the United States, as it did during the recent campaign to unseat Saddam
Hussein, it must be willing to go its own way.
Above all, Canadian policy-makers must dare to entertain the notion that the United States will not be the
world’s only superpower forever. This is not to invite decline or ruin for the US. Rather, it is to do some prudent
long-term planning. Canada’s interests are best served if future superpowers are firmly embedded in
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Ottawa Landmines Convention in 1998,29 the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in
1999,30 and forwarded documents such as The Responsibility to Protect, all initiatives that could
be seen as distinctive Canadian contributions to the rule of international law. All were laudable, if
somewhat visionary, undertakings. They evidently staked out for Canada a position very different
from that of the United States, differentiating us from our southern neighbour in our commitment
to multilateralism and speaking to an idealized vision of international relations that many
countries, particularly smaller ones, could rally around.
The outcome of all of this diplomatic effort has borne mixed fruit. All of the above mentioned
conventions have entered into force with remarkable speed. The pattern could be regarded as a
confirmation of the essential correctness of Canada’s position. At the same time, all have also
come into existence in the face of U.S. opposition and it remains to be seen how successful they
can be given the influence that the most powerful nation in the world continues to exert.
It should also be noted that Canada has not placed all of its cultural protection “eggs” in the
multilateral basket. Notwithstanding the Periodicals debacle, Canada has continued to conclude
bilateral free trade and foreign investment protection agreements with cultural protection clauses
in them.31 It is against this background that a realistic assessment of the CCD needs to be
conducted.
3. THE CCD AS A REALITY
Rights and obligations are the foundation of any modern system of law, including international
law, and so it seems entirely appropriate to focus on their relationship under the CCD as a
means of conducting the analysis.32
In international law states may assume obligations that are either conventional or customary in
origin. In addition, they may assume obligations to one other country bilaterally, to the
international community as a whole (erga omnes) or to a subset thereof (erga omnes partes).33
Once assumed, the tenor of obligations may be either reciprocal, interdependent or integral
depending on the consequences arising from their breach. 34
international institutions and have been “socialized” to co-operate with others in the management of common
problems.”
See Jennifer M. Welsh, Canada in the 21st Century: Beyond Dominion and Middle Power, 16:4 BEHIND THE HEADLINES 13 (2004).
29
36 I.L.M. 1507 (1997).
30
37 I.L.M. 999 (1998).
31
Canada’s bilateral free trade agreements with Chile, Costa Rica and Israel all contain cultural protection clauses, as do many of
Canada’s bilateral foreign investment protection agreements. A list is available at www.international.gc.ca/tna-nac/fipa_list-en.asp.
32
The correspondence of rights and obligations as a hallmark of international law has been recognized in many instances. It is implicit
in the International Law Commission’s Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States, which the U.N. General Assembly
“commended to the continuing attention of [U.N.] Member States”, G.A. Res. 375 (IV) (Dec. 6 1949). It has also been pivotal in a
number of disputes before the International Court of Justice: see Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions
(Qatar v. Bahrain) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), [1994] ICJ Rep. 12 (discussing the fact that a document between the parties “was
not a simple record of a meeting” but something which “enumerat[ed] the commitments to which the Parties have consented. They
thus create rights and obligations in international law for the Parties.” (emphasis added)). For a case where the absence of rights and
obligations precluded the creation of an international agreement see Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (U.K. v. Iran), [1952] ICJ Rep. 93. It
is also true that international obligations may be incurred without any corresponding rights: see Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France),
[1974] ICJ Rep. 253.
33
This is recognized in Arts. 38(1)(a)-(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice and by virtue of the Barcelona Traction
Case [1970], I.C.J. Rep. 4. Article 33(1) of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility recognize that
obligations may be owed either bilaterally or collectively, and that in the latter case, collective obligations may be owed to the
international community as a whole or to a subset thereof. Furthermore, Art. 33(2) makes clear that the ASR are without prejudice to
“any right … which may accrue directly to any person or entity other than a State.” Thus, states may owe obligations to individuals,
groups and affiliations.
34
The distinction between reciprocal, interdependent and integral obligations originates in the work of Gerald Fitzmaurice on the law
of treaties in the 1950s. Fitzmaurice posited that bilateral treaty obligations would be bilateral and that multilateral treaties could be
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The position of international law with respect to rights is somewhat different. The classical
conception of rights is that states are free to do what is not otherwise prohibited,35 although this
conception has changed in recent years with the proliferation of international law, the work of
international organizations, and the need to persistently object to emerging customary
developments.
In general we tend to think of rights and obligations as correspondent, but what is immediately
noteworthy about the CCD is that it is primarily a regime of rights. Thus, in CCD Art. 5(1)
“countries have the sovereign right to formulate and implement their cultural policies and to
protect and promote the diversity of cultural expressions”, in CCD Art. 6(1) countries “may adopt
measures aimed at protecting and promoting the diversity of cultural expressions within [their]
territory”, and in CCD Art. 8(2) a country has the right to “take all appropriate measures to
protect and preserve cultural expressions” where “cultural expressions on its territory are at risk
of extinction, under serious threat, or otherwise in need of urgent safeguarding.”
Obligations in the CCD are less well-defined. Many are exceedingly vague and inconsequential.
Thus, in CCD Art. 12 it states that “[p]arties shall endeavour to strengthen their bilateral, regional
and international cooperation” regarding the promotion of cultural diversity – in essence, a best
efforts approach. In CCD Art. 18 an International Fund for Cultural Diversity is established, but
under Art. 18(7) countries shall merely “endeavour to provide voluntary contributions”. Dispute
settlement under the CCD is optional and by means of conciliation.36
The particular orientation in the CCD has to be contrasted with the WTO legal order, which is
primarily a law of obligations. Under the WTO Agreement the chief obligation is GATT Art.
I:1, the MFN obligation, which provides in relevant part that:
“any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to
any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the like products originating in or destined for
the territories of all other contracting parties.”
MFN is pivotal in the sense that it does away with conditionality and any attempt at preference.
Substantively speaking, it creates a level playing field. MFN’s requirement of nondiscrimination reflects through the rest of the treaty’s text.
However, MFN does much more than establish a norm of non-discrimination. By virtue of its
broad wording it creates a legal regime which is generalized and plenary. Thus, in order to
establish wrongdoing country needs only demonstrate that another country has failed to observe
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its obligations. A presumption of injury operates; there is no requirement of proof.37 There are
other features of the law in this mode too. Because WTO law is generalized, it is in some sense
constitutive and it deals essentially with public property, a property that arises when a single
WTO member makes a commitment that is extended “immediately and unconditionally” to the
rest of the WTO membership.38 The nature of justice is therefore different from what we might
normally expect. Rather than concern itself with who has been harmed by wrongdoing, the
treaty recognizes that in the dense pattern of interaction such obligations give rise to, all
countries are injured and so the aim of justice is to re-establish the distribution of expectations,
nothing more.
At the same time, it is also evident there is something else that is taking place in WTO law.
This is what can be referred to as the adjustment to “realities”. The WTO’s legal order may be
predominantly about obligations, but there is also something else that is occurring at the same
time: this is more evidently a law of rights. What is being referred to here is the right of a
country to do something – for instance, to invoke a safeguard or a countervailing or antidumping duty – a right that can be exercised to deal with situations that are actually
encountered in the course of trade. These rights arise at different points in the treaty
interstitially and present a stark contrast to the character of WTO law as a law of obligations.
Where WTO law in the first mode is generalized and plenary, WTO law in this second mode is
specialized and exceptional. Moreover, in most instances there is a need to demonstrate proof in
order to exercise the right in question. Thus, many WTO disputes have been about whether a
country has met the requisite evidentiary burden in order to invoke its rights. 39
There are substantive consequences to this distinction as well. The law of realities is more
evidently contractual in the sense that a country’s invocation of its rights is more likely to be
regarded as harming one other country, and so the law’s impulse subtly becomes more
corrective. Countries seek to recover for harm done. 40 The law is specific and retrospective, and
naturally becomes concerned with “trade”.
It is then possible to discern a substantive divide at the heart of the WTO Agreement, a divide
which aligns the law of expectation-obligation-distribution on one side against the law of
reality-right-correction on the other. From such an identification it is possible to observe what
Philip Allott has referred to as “idea complexes” 41, or offsetting clusters of norms which
function as the basis of a legal order. Together, they animate the workings of the WTO
See Art. 3.8 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, which provides that “In cases where there is an infringement of the
obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of nullification or
impairment.”
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Agreement.
The structure of rights and obligations in the WTO Agreement alternately constrains and
enables national behaviour in important ways, and is given further momentum by the WTO’s
binding system of dispute settlement.42 The obligations to resolve disputes in accordance with
Art. 23 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding are “particularly important since they
radiate on to all substantive obligations under the WTO.”43 This contrasts sharply with the nonbinding nature of dispute settlement under the CCD.
The greater point to be taken away from the analysis is that this structure provides a substantive
“balance” in the WTO Agreement. Panels and the Appellate Body have frequently referred to
the idea of balance in WTO dispute settlement and attempted to link it to trade, but the truth is
much more subtle.44 The treaty is an enforceable balance of rights and obligations, or if we are
being totally honest, of obligations countered occasionally by rights. That balance tilts in one
direction.
In the CCD, by comparison, the balance tilts in the opposite direction. This is because, as
noted, the treaty is primarily a law of rights, but also because those rights are relatively
unconstrained. Unlike the WTO Agreement, rights under the CCD are lightly conditioned. 45
They do not have many requirements attached to their exercise. There also appears to be little
awareness of mutuality, or the idea that rights must be exercised with rights of others in mind.
Why is this the case? The answer is found in the history and consideration of what the CCD is
designed to do. Many commentators have observed that the Convention came into being as a
direct response to the perception that the WTO Agreement was too onerous. 46 While the WTO
Agreement may have been acceptable as a balance of trade obligations, when viewed in the
larger context of international law, there was something “unbalanced” about it. A correction
was required. The CCD aims to achieve this. The question then becomes how it might do so.
4. THE CONVENTION AS CUSTOM
The rapid conclusion and entry into force of the CCD suggests that many countries were
dissatisfied with the WTO Agreement’s protection of culture and decided to do something
about it en masse elsewhere. What has been engineered in the CCD is directly contrary to the
dominant tendency in WTO law. That is the tendency to recognize the WTO Agreement as the
pre-eminent source of the rights and obligations of WTO member countries, and to relegate of
most other sources of international law to the status of interpretative assistance. To start then,
42
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the CCD may well fulfill such a secondary role.
An example of this interpretative approach occurred in the U.S. – Shrimp case. In that case the
Appellate Body used several sources of international law outside the WTO Agreement,
including the Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development and the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), to assist in interpreting the term
“exhaustible natural resource”. Referring to those documents the Appellate Body was able to
find that exhaustible natural resources included living biological resources such as sea turtles.
This was important for the conclusion that the U.S. law at issue fell within the terms of the
GATT Art. XX(g) general exception. The Appellate Body was therefore able to find that while
the U.S. met the specific terms of the exception, its laws ran afoul only of the nondiscrimination requirements of GATT Art. XX’s preamble.
While it is relatively clear that CCD obligations will not automatically override those of the
WTO Agreement, the fact that they are given expression and formally confirmed in the CCD
implies that the treaty may be used in the same way that the Rio Declaration or CITES was in
Shrimp to bolster a culturally sensitive form of WTO interpretation. The Convention will give
“color, texture and shading” to WTO obligations. 47 It would indeed be strange if a treaty system
which is prepared to protect biological diversity is not likewise prepared to be sensitive to
human cultural diversity.
There is, of course, the fact of the United States’ (and several other countries’) failure to sign
on to the CCD, particularly in light of the panel’s statement in the GMOs dispute. There, the
panel backed away from applying the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol on the basis that not all of
the disputants had ratified the Protocol.48 Three observations may be made in this regard. First,
the statement in GMOs was the statement of a panel, not the Appellate Body, which is superior
in the WTO’s interpretative hierarchy. In any event, the panel in GMOs did not purport to overrule the Appellate Body in Shrimp. Second, rather than see the differences of opinion expressed
in GMOs and Shrimp as a contest among diametrically opposed positions, it may be possible to
reconcile them by reasoning that the WTO dispute settlement system is gradually developing a
more nuanced approach to interpretative use of non-WTO norms. The difference in treatment
exhibited in these cases could be regarded as consistent if one considers the case of CITES,
where there was no record of non-ratification, with that of Cartagena, where there was. It
should be noted that even in GMOs the panel was careful to qualify itself, observing: “the mere
fact that one or more disputing parties are not parties to a convention does not necessarily mean
that a convention cannot shed light on the meaning and scope of a treaty term to be
interpreted.”49Third, the U.S. decision not to sign the CCD has consequences for the U.S.
alone. The Convention could well serve as interpretative assistance in disputes among the 63
states that have ratified as of July 2007.
So far almost all of the substantive discussion concerning the CCD has paid attention to it as a
treaty and to its relationship with other treaties, but the International Court’s dictum in the
Nicaragua Case “that customary international law continues to exist and to apply separately
from international treaty law, even where the two categories of law have an identical content” 50
leads to the question of the CCD’s potential impact as customary international law. This is a
vital matter, not only because it is analytically more complete but because we may discern in
United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, para. 153 (Oct. 12, 1998).
European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, para. 7.94 (Sept. 29,
2006).
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the CCD something more calculated in its conclusion and entry into force - something which
recalls Canada’s experience with the creation of “shelf space” under NAFTA.
The classic requirements of custom are 1) consistent state practice and 2) opinio juris. These
requirements have traditionally been problematic: in the case of practice because it is difficult
to determine what the practice of states as a whole really is, and in the case of opinio juris
because it is possibly even more difficult to determine whether states have acted out of a sense
of legal obligation. The problems with custom have led to innumerable debates about what
custom really is.51
With the growing importance of international organizations like UNESCO, however,
commentators have begun to observe the creation of “new” or “modern” custom. 52 This new
custom is “the product of a deliberative and deliberate process” in international organizations
and is increasingly composed of “intertwined forms of treaty and custom.”53 Drawing on the
work of Abraham and Antonia Chayes, José Alvarez has written that international organizations
“encourage iterated cooperation; promote pooling of information, expertise and resources;
reduce transaction costs, uncertainty and free-riders; and facilitate path dependencies.”54 In this
way “IO venues make possible what would otherwise be increasingly difficult in a world of
nearly 200 nation states: finding concrete, preferably written, evidence that virtually all states
accept a rule as one of custom.”55
The substantive results of this custom-as-process are noteworthy. IO constitutions and treaties
“embedded in a broader institutional framework for elaboration … anticipate a continuous
legislative enterprise by the political organs charged with interpretation. Such treaties, no less
than environmental framework agreements, institutionalize change rather than reify stability.” 56
Their impact is catalytic. Alvarez observes:
The distinction between hard treaty and soft law obligations is no longer as
clear cut as it was, and it is no longer easy to tell whether states are complying
because of a treaty or customary law obligation, or merely because they are
dutifully following organizational expectations. This means as well that it is
sometimes difficult to tell whether certain institutional products … impose
obligations only for those who have notified particular treaties and are therefore
a species of contractual obligation, or are general obligations on all and
therefore a new phenomenon, namely, a species of international legislation.” 57
Perhaps the most important consequence of this “new” custom is that it subtly shifts the burden
of proof. The onus is placed on any state attempting to deny the legal status of such rules.58
UNESCO’s work on the CCD can be regarded as an illustration of the “new” custom in action.
The work of an international organization is providing a shortcut to finding custom. The
shortcut might be regarded as “a relatively more egalitarian approach to finding this source of
51
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law, even if it comes …. at the expense of sometimes elevation the rhetoric of states over their
deeds.”59 That conclusion is fortified by the relatively rapid way in which the CCD was
concluded.
There is, of course, considerable difficulty in determining what custom is, but that problem will
will undoubtedly be resolved over time through process. The CCD establishes a number of
process mechanisms. The Convention is based on a “principle of international solidarity and
cooperation” (CCD Art. 2); it establishes an obligation of consultation and coordination (CCD
Art. 21); a biannual Conference of the Parties (CCD Art. 22) and an annual Intergovernmental
Committee (CCD Art. 23). These are not exceptional in themselves. Many framework-type
agreements contain similar provisions, but they do imply a commitment to work with the aim
of cultural diversity more squarely in mind in future.
5. CONCLUSION
An alternative to thinking about the CCD is to contemplate a world without a CCD-type
instrument, and here it is clear that the pre-existing situation – one of little express protection
for cultural diversity in the international trading regime – was inadequate. There was a sense of
concern about the threat that untrammeled trade presented to cultural diversity. A deep vein of
apprehension erupted in the form of the CCD, which now seeks to rebalance the landscape of
international law.
The lingering issue in the debate about shelf space, now transposed to the global stage, is what
will be permitted and protected. And here North American experience is apposite because quite
apart from the treaty’s validity as hard law – and we can legitimately wonder just how “hard”
the law emanating from the CCD will ever be - the CCD is perhaps best placed to serve a
“marker”, or sign, of something else. The contours of what that is, however, will remain
undefined. Consequently, the CCD’s impact is likely to be diffuse and indirect.
We also have to recognize that values of diversity are already recognized in existing WTO
commitments, whether this is in the form of the exception for “public morals” or possibly
human health. An ethos of respect for other interests is there. The aim of the trading system is
not to debase the individual, to view him or her solely as homo economicus. It is to uplift
people in order to ensure meaningful choice and to promote transformative possibilities so that
life can be lived as it is envisioned in the U.N. Charter - that is, as “life in larger freedom”. The
CCD should help to achieve this goal.
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